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Chinese to English: 刘志军的玫瑰梦是中国人的噩梦 (The “Chinese Dream” of a corrupt official is the nightmare of the Chinese people) General field: Bus/Financial Detailed field: Real Estate
The former Minister for Railways, Liu Zhijun, had wanted to devote all of his energies to realising the “Chinese Dream”. Now he stood in a courtroom, crying and slobbering as he swore to tell the truth. It seemed to be almost black humour as with deep emotion he made clear to the court just what exactly he understood his Chinese Dream to be. There were 477 separate charges against this once powerful man, and as the court progressed through them, a clear picture emerged of his Chinese Dream: gold, investments, entertainment, girls, antiques, luxury apartments … Luckily, when his case had been dealt with, the proceeds of the bribes he had accepted were recovered; amongst the proceeds were a mere 374 apartments with a value exceeding RMB 800 million.
As more details of the court’s investigation came into the public view, the Chinese Dream of Liu Zhijun seemed to be a kind of sick joke that gave people a lot to think about. Let’s consider this announcement of the court:
“Pursuant to the current case, altogether RMB 18,359,565.81, USD 129,703 and HKD 40,000 has been seized. Pursuant to related cases, the following assets has been seized or frozen: RMB 23,057,146.08, 27,700 shares in Shandong Gold Limited, 600,000 shares in Jiadian Electronics Limited and RMB3,000,000 worth of financial products;
Because Liu Zhijun’s abuse of his position gave rise to economic loss, in relation to other cases the following assets have been seized or frozen: RMB 795,536,418.55, USD 235,657.22, Euro 2,232,021, CAN157,205.32, HKD 85,251,441.44, 9 brokerage accounts, 37 apartments, 100% of the shares in Bohaoruiting Hotels and 337 apartments, 16 cars, 100% of the memberships rights in Yingcai Association, 60% of the shares in Zhibo Limited and 612 valuable collectibles (jewelery and works of art).”
The list of the proceeds of Liu Zhijun’s corruption dazzles the eyes, there is enough to justify commissioning a famous auction house to hold a grand auction of his ill gotten gains! Further, Liu Zhijun’s 374 apartments (Chinese cities generally do not have free-standing houses) set a new record for property ownership and prove once again that absolute power corrupts absolutely. Thinking of the 374 apartments corruptly obtained by Liu Zhijun brings to mind all of the talk and no action on real estate tax.
In late May, a spokesman for the National Reform and Development Commission stated that notwithstanding the five measures for controlling the real estate market promulgated by the State Council in February, real estate prices had continued to increase. The spokesman said that the market had great hopes that the real estate tax currently being piloted in Shanghai and Chongqing could help stabilise the market and prevent it from overheating; in particular it was hoped that the expansion of the real estate tax to other parts of the country in the second half of the year would have a concrete effect on the real estate market. However, no sooner had the National Reform and Development Commission spokesman made this statement than he was contradicted by an official from the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. The Ministry of Housing official stated that the real state tax should be viewed as long-term tax collection policy and that it was very difficult to use regulatory measures to control a market in the short term. If it was desired to use regulatory measures to control a market in the short term, restricting sale transactions or the availability of debt should still be the first choice in preference to tax policy.
The Ministry of Housing official went on to say that the view at senior levels of the relevant local governments was that when it came to reforming the tax system, pilot cities, trial period times and test cases should all be chosen very carefully. In particular, expansion of the real estate tax beyond the existing pilot cities of Shanghai and Chongqing was something that should definitely not be rushed into. Following this statement, many experts and commentators rushed to take up the baton, eagerly pointing out the difficulties of major taxation reform and concluding that conditions were not ripe for the expansion of the real estate tax to the rest of the country.
Although it is difficult to know what to make of the position with two senior government officials flatly contradicting each other, this uncertain state of affairs is not cause for surprise. The regulation of the real estate market in China has a 10 year history; the more the market is regulated the more prices go up, the more prices go up the more the market is regulated. It seems that nothing can be done to stabilize the market. An important reason for this is that the regulation of the real estate market involves many different parts of government, each with its own agenda, meaning that cooperation between the relevant parts of government has not been possible with each part of government pursuing its own different incentives.
At the end of last year, the Central Economic Work Conference, which is ultimately responsible for setting the national economic agenda, provided that the real estate tax should be expanded. The Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation played the leading role in this decision; those two agencies have been ceaselessly warning of the social dangers posed by the rising property market. In particular, in the current year property prices have risen in 70 large and medium sized cities and many cities have also seen property prices rise on a rolling 12 month basis. As the bubble in the real estate market grows, the gap between rich and poor (in particular, those who can afford to buy real estate and those who cannot) becomes larger and the resultant social problems become more serious.
At the same time the court decision made public Liu Zhijun’s 374 apartments, it was reported that there are now 160,000 university graduates who cannot find stable employment living in the outer suburbs of Beijing, with 70% of these people having less than 10 square metres in living space. Faced with a loss of control of property prices that may give rise to severe economic disruption and social unrest, taking the drastic step of expanding the real estate tax may be the government’s last weapon.
Practically however, the resistance to the expansion of the real estate tax only continues to grow. It is said that it is easier to persuade someone to sell their soul than to act against their economic self-interest. Regulation of the real estate market in China is bogged down in a morass of problems and it is very difficult to summon the political will to take decisions that can lead to real reform. Liu Zhijun’s 374 apartments are an extreme case, but it is already very common for government officials to own several different apartments.
A mid-ranking government official in Beijing says: “Among people of my level, it would be difficult to find anyone that doesn’t own several apartments. At current market prices, each property is worth over RMB 1,000,000. If I had to pay the real estate tax, it would wipe out my salary for a year and who would be willing to rise in revolution against themselves like that? This is the heart of the matter. When you raise your hand to levy tax, the small fry won’t escape but I’m more than afraid that you won’t be able to put your hand in your own pocket. This proves that is easier to persuade someone to sell their soul than to act against their economic self-interest.”.
Liu Zhijun-style interest groups have infiltrated almost every level of society. Recently, the media exposed the case of customs officials in Shenzhen pooling funds to build apartments and selling them at 1/3 of the market price. These officials obviously are not going to stop at owning just a couple of apartments themselves and it follows that they would oppose the real estate tax. In many places, government officials are able to avoid disclosing all of their interests in property and it is far from uncommon for government officials at or above a relatively low level to own 8 or 10 apartments.
For county-level officials, official policy provides that on becoming county head or party secretary, husband and wife would both be assigned housing (with a required contribution of a few hundred RMB per square metre to the extent the housing is larger than standard). The official would also have housing in the city that he could use when his work duties took him there (of course, some housing might be in the name of a government body, but it would be available for the use of the relevant official). When the county level official is promoted to become a provincial level official, who at the county level is going to be brave enough to be the bad guy, to chase after the back of his old boss and ask for the housing back? To turn your old boss’ place into the county logistics department is the hardest task under heaven!
Therefore, by the time some officials retire, because they have been assigned housing in several different places, they have managed to hang on to seven or eight apartments, this is not rare at all. If their children have gone overseas, there may be no one living in the apartments, so it is necessary to impose on the official’s driver. Each rainy season, the drivers have to help out their boss by looking after their apartments, opening the windows to let some fresh air in, getting rid of any mold, living for a few days in the apartment in the county then for a few days in the apartment in the city. The drivers don’t enjoy this, they complain to each other, and the number of apartments each boss has becomes tradable gossip; this guy has five apartments, that guy has eight.
Not long ago, a newspaper reported that it is easy to get into assigned housing, but very difficult for the government to get the apartment back afterwards. Over the course of several years, one city could not even manage to get 10 apartments back. The apartments that it did manage to get back were all public housing assigned to poor people from the very lowest level of society who could not afford housing without assistance, it is not easy for such people to send their children to university and they can be pressured to hand back the housing. But there are very many apartments in China that were assigned to government officials and, even though the government official has moved away and is no longer living there, there is no mechanism to force the official to give the apartment back.
Of course, real estate taxation has a particular deterrent effect. When the five measures for controlling the real estate market were promulgated by the State Council in February and it was said that there would be a 20% gains tax on real estate, real estate markets all around the country were thrown into uproar and some officials owning multiple apartments moved to divest themselves of the property. However, when the initial shock of the realisation that the State Council had really decided to impose a 20% tax had passed, it became clear that officials at the level of government responsible for implementing the tax were ignoring the decision. Thus, a duly enacted regulation of the State Council, the chief administrative authority of the Peoples’ Republic of China could be magically transformed into a worthless piece of paper because it adversely affected so many peoples’ interests. When it became clear that the regulation would not be put into effect, officials who had hung on to their apartments could breathe a sigh of relief as they realised that, as usual, no real reform would occur.
Obviously, since Liu Zhijun owned 374 apartments through various aliases, he would strongly oppose any real estate tax. The absence of any real estate tax is the Chinese Dream of the corrupt. But the Chinese Dream of the corrupt is the nightmare of the Chinese people.
For a long time the law of the jungle has prevailed in Chinese real estate markets. Dazzled by the potential profits, people become more and more confused and the fundamentals of the market get further and further away from reality. This is extremely dangerous. Faced with the disordered state of the market, a real estate tax could be used like a sword to the throat to compel a return to rationality. However, the real estate tax trial has lasted over two years in both Shanghai and Chongqing but is still confined to those two cities. There is extremely strong resistance to expanding the real estate tax to other parts of the country, various interest groups and commentators are escalating the various strategies they are using to oppose the tax.
Reform of the regulation of the real estate market has reached a stalemate. Using an array of deep and difficult to counter strategies, special interest groups have managed to take government policy hostage. Further, opponents of reform have continued to organise themselves into powerful blocs that can effectively promote a selfish agenda which more and more leads to an unfair society; the position is already scandalous.
Amid the storms of 30 years of unrestrained economic growth, China has dissipated a great amount of its precious natural resources. In order to support continued economic growth, making the best use of its limited natural resources such as land is becoming more and more important. If vested interests and special interest groups are allowed to sabotage reform, if hard decisions cannot be made, if no omelette is made for fear of breaking eggs, if the contradictions in Chinese society cannot be addressed, then in the end a much heavier price will need to be paid.
This is a test of the new generation of Chinese political leaders – to show greater wisdom and courage in finding a way to push through the needed reforms in this area. In this economic and social transition period, having regard to not only safe and responsible economic and financial management but also the life or death need of the Communist Party to maintain its legitimacy and mandate by tackling corruption, it is necessary to decisively act against vested interests and take control of real estate reform by introducing a unified national system of housing registration and extension of the real estate tax as signature reforms. In order to implement these reforms, decisiveness and courage will be essential. Otherwise, the more reform is delayed the more difficult it will become, and the more difficult reform becomes the more it will be delayed and things will never change.
To make a few people suffer or to make the whole country suffer? This is the decision that will determine China’s fate.
Chinese to English: 命名人谈克强经济学支柱:不刺激去杠杆和搞改革 (Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s economic policy christened “Likonomics”; based on three principles: no stimulus, deleveraging and reform) General field: Bus/Financial Detailed field: Economics
It was the then Chief Economist of Barclays Asia, Huang Yiping, who coined the term “Likonomics” to describe the economic policy of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang; that is, the economic policy that Li Keqiang is using as his guide in planning the growth of the Chinese economy. Huang Yiping thus gave a name to an economic philosophy that seemed to take on a life of its own from its very inception, since the potential it carries for needed reform has raised the hopes of many.
As the term “Likonomics” spread, it could be seen as building on the philosophical basis of the “Li Keqiang Index” devised by Li Keqiang during his tenure as Party Secretary of Liaoning Province, which contributed to it becoming a hot “Made in China” financial buzzword. As a time of monumental reform dawns in China, the advent of a new premier with heavyweight credentials including an economics PhD means that a certain glamour attaches to the term “Likonomics” and it has claimed its own place in the imagination of political and financial observers.
All sorts of controversies and disagreements go hand in hand with any discussion of the Chinese economy. Huang Yiping has left his full time job in business to return to Peking University National Development Research Centre as a professor, and has just given an exclusive interview to a China Enterprise Media reporter. In this interview, Huang Yiping recalls how his term “Likonomics” caught fire in the popular imagination and clears up some misunderstandings.
Likonomics has not just caused a sensation in academic circles; its real significance is its practical effect on the lives of ordinary people. The outside world wants to know: What direction will the reovultionary power of Likonomics take China?
From the “Li Keqiang Index” to “Likonomics”
During his time as Party Secretary of Liaoning, Li Keqiang liked to rely on three measures to track the economic progress of the province: total provincial railway freight, total provincial electricity consumption and total loans made by banks. The virtue of these three measures is that, unlike most economic statistics, there is no room for subjectivity or manipulation in their measurement, which greatly reduces the risk of errors in macroeconomic forecasting. At the end of 2010, the Economist dubbed these three measures the “Li Keqiang Index” and promoted it as a way to assess Chinese GDP growth.
Honours do not come singly; in the middle of 2013, the term Likonomics came into vogue. Huang Yiping remembers: “At the end of June, I wrote a final “Postcard from Beijing” for all of Barclays Capital global clients in which I coined the term “Likonomics” to summarise the three main planks of Li Keqiang’s economic platform: absence of stimulus, deleveraging and reform.
Referring to deleveraging, structural reform and the avoidance of a large-scale stimulus plan as Likonomics has become accepted usage for Barclays. In its latest research report, Barclays states that Likonomics is just what China needs, because China desperately needs to find a path to return to sustainable growth.
According to the Wall Street Journal, considering the wide array of existing finance jargon such as Grexit, twist, taper and Abenomics, adding yet another term such as Likonomics might be going too far. However, bearing in mind the global importance of how China handles its development, it is certainly worth creating a new word to describe what is being done. In short, the essence of Likonomics is to accept short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain.
Barclays forecasts a possibility that a policy of deleveraging and economic rebalancing may push China towards a momentary “hard landing”; that is, in the next three years it is possible that there may be a quarter where economic growth drops to around 3%. However, such a reduced rate of economic growth should be temporary only, because the economic reform program should eventually benefit the whole economy; conversely, to force short term economic growth beyond what is natural could be counter-productive in the long run. To put it another way, some fluctutations over a long economic cycle may become the normal state of the Chinese economy.
Societe General Chief Economist Lu Zhengwei states that Likonomics has a further distinguishing characteristic; it is flexible rather than dogmatic. At an economic conference on July 16, Premier Li Keqiang put forward upper and lower limits on macroeconomic controls that could be used to assess the performance of the current strategy and strengthen the focus on the bottom line. Unlike Abenomics and Thatcherism, whose adherents insisted they be implemented without modification regardless of the strength of the resistance to them, Li Keqiang’s management style is much more flexible. Therefore, in the second half of the year some stimulus measures may be introduced. However, even in this case, Lu Zhengwei considers any such stimulus would be gentle.
With a touch of humour, Lu Zhengwei notes that one of Likonomics three main policies, “deleveraging” would be better referred to as “not increasing leverage” to reflect what is happening in practice. That is, if for example a business had a debt to equity ratio of 2:1, “deleveraging” should mean the debt to equity ratio was reduced to, say, 1.5:1, whereas “not increasing leverage” could mean the debt to equity ratio stays steady at 2:1 and does not go up.
Mizuho Securities’ Chief Economist Shen Jianguang says that the key point of the three pillars of Likonomics is to result in appropriate pricing and remove barriers to entry, which takes the reform process into deep water.
As a student of Professor Li Yining, the famous expert on the benefits of market based reforms, Li Keqiang’s economic philosophy is based on an appreciation of the ability of markets to allocate resources to where they will be best used. Shen Jianguang states that Likonomics is a supply-side based approach to economics and can be distinguished from the traditional Keynesian economic school that relies only on macroeconomic factors such as monetary and financial policies to adjust demand. In March this year, Southern Weekly had already stated that Li Keqiang’s economic policy could be summarised as clarifying the border between the government and the market.
In his first 100 days after assuming office, Premier Li Keqiang gave three clear policy signals. First, the government definitely would not implement a large-scale stimulus plan. Second, that government tolerance for a lower rate of economic growth was increasing. Third, the government was firmly committed to driving forward comprehensive reform of the economic system; structural reform rather than base line growth would be the most important output of the Chinese economy. From these three policy signals we can already see the core theoretical principles of Likonomics.
Huang Yiping confessed to our reporter that he has not yet heard what Li Keqiang himself thinks of the way “Likonomics” has been written up in the press. However, many commentators both within and outside of China have acknowledged that Li Keqiang has repeatedly made his policy direction clear over the last few months and that this new policy direction finally has the possibility of leaving behind the uncoordinated, unbalanced, ineffective and unsustainable measures currently being used to push growth, and thus put the Chinese economy on the path to long term sustainable growth. It is exactly this end that Likonomics is directed towards. As for the conclusion of other media on the content of Likonomics, there are some that take a different interpretation, but the majority cannot identify any great difference.
Clearing up misunderstandings and dispelling the fear of a hard landing
Huang Yiping told our China Enterprise News reporter that he wanted to correct two very obvious mistakes that were currently made in discussing Likonomics. First, Likonomics is not itself an economic theory; rather, it is best understood as either a framework for Li Keqiang’s economic policymaking or a policy direction. There are precedents for this; both Abenomics and Reaganomics were not taken blindly from theoretical manuals. Second, Likonomics is not “shock therapy”; Chinese economic reform has never involved shock therapy in the true sense of the term.
A related mistake is to think that Likonomics may even push the Chinese economy towards a hard landing. “I definitely underestimated the extent of the market’s reaction to the threat of a hard landing,” Huang Yiping said. But he thinks that the current hard landing phobia is an unnecessary side effect of measures that have been taken to ensure that sustainable growth is possible in the long term. This has led to some volatility in the growth rate, which has sent the market into panic.
Huang Yiping also wanted to dispel the fear that an economic cycle will inevitably have downs as well as ups, and made three points in this respect. First, defining what is a “hard landing” is a very subjective question. Today, we think a hard landing is a reduction in the growth rate, but tomorrow we may think differently. In the past, we were extremely worried that the GDP growth rate might drop below 8% but now a growth rate of less than 8% has become normal. Second, looking at things logically, the GDP growth rate will obviously decrease in the next few years, this is inevitable. We talk of a reduction in the growth rate as being a “hard landing”, but in other new market economies, this is regarded as a trivially normal occurrence. Third, the economic cycle includes both ups and downs, the down period is a necessary process to winnow out poor investments and improve the overall quality of the economy. Nevertheless, Huang Yiping would never say that any government can or should allow a real hard landing of the economy, nor should any government ignore the economic situation.
To what extent is Likonomics practically applicable to China? Huang Yiping considers the three principles of Likonomics – absence of a large-scale stimulus program, an appropriate degree of deleveraging and management of financial sector risks and comprehensively pushing for structural reform are not merely academic concepts but represent the extremely clear economic strategy and policy direction of the Chinese government.
Huang Yiping stated that when the new government took office, it had very clearly set a new policy direction, including by Premier Li Keqiang himself continually reaffirming some important policy signals. For example, by making clear the difficulty of new investment continuing to be driven by the government rather than the private sector, the importance of making the best use of incremental capacity and building up reserves and that the most important economic output is structural reform. At the end of last year, when the rate of growth in the economy continuously slowed down, the government was beset by a chorus of cries from the market to follow the old road of introducing a stimulus package. But the government was at all times extremely calm in assessing the economic situation and avoided aggressive measures. All levels of government concentrated their energies on planning all aspects of their reform program.
Huang Yiping said that the absence of stimulus, or more accurately, not continuing to implement large-scale stimulus measures to support economic growth (to put it another way, the absence of excessive stimulus), involves no contradiction with promoting stable economic growth. Huang Yiping repeatedly stressed that the current need for stability of growth should not be confused with the past need to increase growth because there was an essential difference between the two. He stated that any government must take appropriate macroeconomic measures to stabilise the economy, the United States and China were no different in this respect. Of course, the past focus on increasing growth had pushed the country’s GDP growth rate to 9%, or even higher levels. The current focus on stable growth therefore must use financial and monetary measures to slow down the growth rate in order to make the GDP growth rate progressively stablise at a level determined by the country’s new growth capacity. Premier Li Keqiang has recently determined that there should be a floor on the GDP growth rate of 7% or even a little lower; this makes very clear the distinction between the current need for stable growth and the past need to increase growth.
Leading minds in the ongoing construction of Likonomics
Returning to Reaganomics and Thatcherism, we can see that the head of state or a leading thinker in the government may give their name to an economic program; however, the economic program depends not just on that person but on the achievements of the whole government. On this basis, we can say that Likonomics is still under construction.
By mid this year, there were signs that Li Keqiang had a minimum lower limit on targeted growth. A Ministry of Industry and Information Technology spokesman stated that based on the data, the current macroeconomic indicators did not give cause for optimism, most macroeconomic indicators were towards the bottom of the minimum acceptable range. Some macroeconomic indicators were bordering on the minimum acceptable amount with some even below that amount and continuing to trend downwards. On the 17 July Midyear Economic Forum, the National Development and Reform Commission took the lead in presenting to Premier Li Keqiang on behalf of all the ministries and commissions a plan for economic regulation measures to be taken in the second half of the year. This plan placed emphasis on achieveing stable growth through local stimulus measures.
The main measures in China’s economic regulatory policy for the second half of the year represent Li Keqiang’s first interventionist draft policy, faced as he is with a continuously worsening economic outlook. The moment has arrived in which we can see what fine tuning adjustments Li Keqiang will make to the contradiction plagued and uncertain Chinese economy.
In the wake of these economic developments, have there been any changes to the core philosophical framework of Likonomics? Huang Yiping said that Likonomics is a framework to set the policy direction for at least the next five to ten years. The judgement of this policy direction naturally cannot depend on local conditions in just a few places, nor can we rush to judgement based on short-term considerations. While Li Keqiang must take a big picture and long-term view, the trend is for individual parts of government to be more influenced by short-term economic fluctuations, with different parts of government placing stress on different factors. For example, the National Development and Reform Commission wants to increase the number of projects under development and the Ministry of Commerce wants to protect exports, there are many more such examples.
Huang Yiping stated that in order to judge whether there have been any changes to the core philosophical framework of Likonomics, first we should look to whether there will be a comprehensive stimulus program to protect the growth rate of the country as a whole, as there was in 2008. Second, we should see if between now and the time of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party there are exploratory discussions recommending a series of reform measures. In his judgement, the central government decision on 19 July to remove the regulatory floor on bank lending rates kept an important promise and demonstrates the resolve of the central government to continue to push through reform by transforming the levers of growth in the Chinese economy. If the policy goal really does turn into prioritising defending growth above stablising growth, the central government can now directly lower bank lending rates in the absence of the floor in order to add liquidity to the financial system. In addition, the abolition of the floor on bank lending rates represents an important interest rate policy reform and even an important step in the liberalisation of the financial system
A media summary is that one of the essential points of Likonomics is that it is government policy to reap economic gains by empowering the market. This is according to the decision of the State Council to continue to drive forward systemic innovation in order to benefit from a reform dividend, encourage the market to flourish and to prmote the realisation of annual economic and social development goals. Although non-Chinese commentators make all kinds of conjectures about the content of Likonomics, we can be certain that the policy of the Chinese government to carry out market empowering reforms will not become bogged down. These reforms are now entering uncharted territory and China is experiencing the pain that comes from all transformational change. Likonomics is not the work of any one individual. It represents not only the collective wisdom and economic experience of a new national leadership group but is based on reflection on and the development of China’s economic results and successes over the past 30 or more years.
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Other - Professional Translator (Chinese to English) - National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) (Australia)
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Years of experience: 12. Registered at ProZ.com: Jul 2013.
I am currently a qualified freelance translator specialising in business/financial translation from Chinese to English.
I am a native speaker of English and have passed both:
- the top level of the official Chinese government Mandarin exam - 汉语水平考试六级 (New HSK6); and
- the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) Professional Translator examination (Chinese to English). (NAATI is the government run national standards and accreditations body for translators and interpreters in Australia.)
My translation work experience includes a three month contract as a full time in-house translator at the leading Chinese private equity firm CITIC PE and full time employment as a translator at the leading translation company CLS Communication.
Prior to working as a translator, I worked for five years at a "Big 4" accounting firm and then for seven years at two leading international corporate law firms. As a result, I have particular expertise in general business, legal and accounting translation. My translation interests also include literary translation.
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